Will income inequality cause a middle-income trap in Asia?  Bruegel Working Paper 2013/06, 10 October 2013 by Egawa, Akio
WILL INCOME
INEQUALITY CAUSE A
MIDDLE-INCOME
TRAP IN ASIA?
AKIO EGAWA*
Highlights
￿ The Asian economy is expected to realise favourable growth during
the first half of this century, but there is no guarantee. There is a
discussion about a ‘middle-income trap’, which refers to a country
that has realised rapid growth to become a middle-income country
but is unable to grow further. A middle-income trap could occur not
only if there is a delay in shifting the economy toward a producti-
vity-driven structure, but also if there is a worsening of income dis-
tribution. We consider this in line with the theories of development
economics and through a quantitative analysis. The relationship
between income inequality and the trap can be explained by the
Kuznets hypothesis and the basic-needs approach. Our quantita-
tive analysis supports the Kuznets hypothesis, and indicates that,
although a low-income country can accelerate its economic growth
with the worsening of income distribution as an engine, a middle-
income country would experience a decreasing growth rate if it fails
to narrow the income gap between the top and bottom income
groups. The results also show that the basic-needs approach is also
applicable in practice, and imply that the improvement of access to
secondary education is important.
￿ A sensitivity analysis for three Asian upper-middle-income coun-
tries (China, Malaysia and Thailand) also shows that the situation
related to a middle-income trap is worse than average in China and
Malaysia. These two countries, according to the result of the sen-
sitivity analysis, should urgently improve access to secondary
education and should implement income redistribution measures
to develop high-tech industries, before their demographic divi-
dends expire. Income redistribution includes the narrowing of rural-
urban income disparities, benefits to low-income individuals, direct
income transfers, vouchers or free provision of education and
health-care, and so on, but none of these are simple to implement. 
* National Institute for Research Advancement, Japan, and Visiting
Fellow, Bruegel. 
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Will income inequality cause a middle-income trap in Asia? 
 
Akio Egawa 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Many Asian countries have reached the status of middle-income countries (MICs) after achieving 
rapid growth (see Annex Table 1), and are expected to grow further in the first half of this century.  The 
Asian Development Bank’s (2011) main scenario for Asia’s economic growth up to 2050, known as the 
“Asian Century” scenario, is that Asia’s share of world GDP will become 50.6 percent (up from 27.4 
percent in 2010) and Asia’s per-capita GDP will exceed the world average in 2050.   
The attractiveness of Asia’s current and future economy comes not only from its high economic 
growth rate. As the current MICs in Asia have large populations, their future buoyant economic growth 
will offer a larger and growing market to the world economy. Buoyant economic growth in Asian 
“dinosaurs” has expanded the ranks of those who earn enough to boost consumption of non-necessary 
goods and services – the middle-income class. I estimated (Egawa, 2012a) that the population of the 
middle-income class
1 in 10 Asian countries
2 grew from 170 million in 2000 to 1.64 billion in 2011, and 
would become 2.4 billion (73 percent of total population) in 2020. This offers a great investment and 
sales opportunity for final consumption goods and services from around the world, and also provides 
an additional engine for economic growth, generating more stable and solid longer-term growth for the 
country concerned. Furthermore, Asian countries are trying to integrate into one economic region with a 
large population and economic share by improving logistical connectivity and by concluding and 
upgrading free trade agreements. These efforts will facilitate a move up the value chain and further 
reduce the total cost of production in multinational supply chains in which Asian countries are involved.   
However, this does not mean that Asia’s strong economic growth is without risk. ADB (2011) also 
provides a risk scenario for Asia’s economic growth towards 2050, called the “middle-income trap” 
scenario. It estimates that Asia's share of world GDP would be 32 percent under this scenario, only a 
small increase from 27.4 percent in 2010. This paper analyses the causes of a middle-income trap and 
how countries can avoid or overcome one. We focus in particular on upper-middle-income countries 
(UMICs) in Asia, ie Malaysia, China and Thailand. In addition, we argue via a cross-country quantitative 
analysis that income inequality, which is present in most countries in Asia and is considered a by-
                                                            
1 The middle-income class is defined as member of households with annual disposable incomes of between $5000 and 
$35000 (fixed at 2011 exchange rates and prices). 
2 China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 2 
 
product of rapid growth, can play a role in triggering the trap. Our analysis shows that income inequality 
is a significant factor in reducing the economic growth rate and potentially leading to a middle-income 
trap. 
 
2.  What is a middle-income trap? 
 
A middle-income trap refers to a situation in which an MIC falls into economic stagnation and 
becomes unable to advance its economy to a high-income level for certain reasons specific to MICs. 
The first comprehensive discussion about the problem of a middle-income trap appeared in Gill et al 
(2007). Gill et al regard some Latin American countries as having fallen into the trap, reasoning that 
they realised fast growth to become MICs by extracting and exporting their natural resources, but fell 
into a long-term stagnation thereafter. Gill et al apply this observation to four countries in Asia 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), and suggest that they should upgrade their 
economic structures. 
A middle-income trap in Asia is usually discussed as a future risk, whereas in Latin America it is 
seen as a past event and is considered solely as a delay or failure to change economic structures in a 
timely way. Asian MICs do not have abundant natural resources, but, as Gill et al (2007) and ADB 
(2011) discuss, their cheap and abundant labour forces are regarded as a resource. However, even in 
the ADB’s middle-income trap scenario, Asia’s economy would grow a little faster than the world 
average. So, it has become difficult to judge if the country concerned falls into a trap or not because we 
no longer have a common understanding of the numerical criterion of the trap. This sometimes makes 
the discussion complicated. For example, some argue that the recent decline in economic growth rates 
in Asian upper-middle income countries has to be regarded as a symptom of falling into the trap, while 
others think that it marks a soft landing of the economy from a bubble-like situation. 
A middle-income trap is recognised as the risk of (1) long-term economic stagnation, which (2) 
MICs suffer from as a consequence of their economic and social structures that are unique to MICs. It is 
generally agreed that a delay or failure to change the economic structure from an input-driven growth 
model into a productivity-driven growth model is a factor in triggering the risk of a middle-income trap. 
However, as a “middle-income trap in Asia” has not yet been seen, a wider range of economic and social 
phenomena tend to be regarded as risk factors. ADB (2011) and Eichengreen et al (2011) identify the 
factors of “economic slowdown”. These include inequity within a country, competition for natural 
resources, carbon emission limitations, migration, global warming, bad governance and corruption, 
ageing populations combined with declining birthrates, absence of trade openness, and over-
depreciation of currencies. Of these, the main causes of a middle-income trap should be the factors 3 
 
that were not a problem when the countries were at low-income level but become a problem when they 
reach MIC level. The other factors can be regarded as factors in the economic slowdown, but not as 
middle-income trap factors. For example, an increase in the wage level is considered as triggering a risk 
of falling into the trap, and is a problem after the country concerned becomes a MIC. On the other hand, 
competition for finite natural resources, limitation of carbon emissions, and global warming and climate 
change are problems irrespective of income level. Table 1 categorises the various factors. A failure to 
bring about timely economic structural change is a factor leading to a middle-income trap by definition, 
and all the factors listed in the left-hand column of Table 1 except those related to worsening income 
inequality are considered to be related to economic structural changes or productivity. A brief 
observation on the situation of productivity in Asian MICs and necessary policies for avoiding the trap 
are discussed in the Appendix. 
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Table 1: Factors behind a middle-income trap and economic slowdown 
  Middle-income trap Economic slowdown, others 
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  (1) Inability to increase the inputs 
• Increase in wage level 
• Excessive public investment 
(2) Worsening of the problem unique to MICs 
• Over-dependence on exporting manufacturing 
• Regional income disparity 
• Income inequality among households 
• Population ageing, drying-up of demographic dividend 
(*arguable)
 3 
(1) Limitation of input-driven growth, but Low-
income countries also suffer 
• Limitation of using natural resources 
(competition for them), global warming 
(2) Other factors 
• Increase of the number of migrants 
• Intentional over-devaluation of currency 
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(1) Inability or limitation to improve productivity
• Lack of innovation and investment in R&D 
• Inefficient use of the infrastructures 
• Insufficient inter-industry labour mobility 
• Insufficiency of the amount and quality of higher 
education and vocational training 
• Mono-/oligopoly of main industries by state-owned 
enterprises 
• Lack of government’s ability to formulate and implement 
a comprehensive economic growth strategy 
• Poor governance, Spread of corruption 
• Policy for excessively protecting low-productivity 
industries (including agriculture) 
(2) Inability to solve the problem unique for MICs 
• Failure of facilitating domestic demand 
• Failure in implementing income redistributional policy 
measures  Delay in human development (education 
and health-care for the bottom of the pyramid), shortage 
of government budget for economic reforms  
(1) Relevant with the limitation of improving 
productivity, but low-income countries also 
suffer 
• Lack of economic (hard) infrastructures 
• Political uncertainty / unrest 
(1’) Measures for improving productivity 
•  Opening up of trade and investment 
abroad (incl. harmonisation of products 
standards and business practices, etc.) 
• Completion of AEC (ASEAN Economic 
Community)  
(2) Relevant with the inability to solve the 
problem unique for MICs, but low-income 
countries also suffer 
• Too small budget (lack of tax-collecting 
power) 
Source: Bruegel.   
 
  
                                                            
3 Fertility rate and dependency ratio are related to the discussion on 'draining of demographic dividend' (or 'demographic 
onus'), and this phenomenon can be seen typically in middle-income countries. Demographic onus is not a factor 
affecting long-term economic growth potential, but a factor technically reducing the economic growth rate. However, in the 
field of demography studies, the change in demographic structure is considered to be related to economic development. 
Therefore, these factors remain to be categorised in the left-hand column of Table 1. 5 
 
3.  Income inequality and the middle-income trap 
 
How then should we consider the relationship between income inequality and the middle-income 
trap? Most MICs in Asia have failed to improve income distribution, or have left income inequality 
untreated, while they elaborate and implement policies and medium-term plans for economic 
structural change. If worsening income inequality is also a factor that might trigger a fall into a middle-
income trap, governments should deal with it as aggressively as they deal with economic structural 
change.   
 
Does income inequality have any relevance to the middle-income trap? 
The arguments about whether income inequality is a cause of the middle-income trap are 
conflicting, but the basic structure of conflict is the same as an old argument in development 
economics
4. One argument is based on the theory of growth accounting. It states that worsening 
income distribution cannot affect the economic growth rate at least in the long term, because change in 
income distribution cannot affect innovation or growth of total factor productivity. According to this 
argument, only two possible kinds of causality would exist between them. One is that worsening 
income inequality would cause social unrest and, as a result, become a drag on economic growth. But 
this is not a fundamental cause of economic stagnation. The other is that inequality may occur as a by-
product of growth. A typical argument is the discussion of income inequality brought about by 
urbanisation. In MICs in Asia, economic growth has been mainly driven by industrialisation in urban 
areas. As a result, migration occurred from rural to urban areas, and the urban population grew at a 
higher rate than the rural population. This causes rapid urbanisation with a widening of rural-urban 
income disparities and worsening of intra-urban income disparity, both of which in theory cause 
nationwide income inequality (Lambert, 1994). Figure 1 shows that countries except Indonesia and 
Thailand exhibit a positive relationship between the rate of urbanisation and the Gini coefficient. 
Regarding this, Kanbur and Zhuang (2013) conduct a quantitative analysis of which factors out of 
urbanisation, rural-urban income disparities, intra-urban income inequality and intra-rural income 
inequality contribute to worsening income inequality at the national level from the early 1990s to the 
late 2000s. They find that, among four countries analysed (India, China, Indonesia and the 
Philippines), the increase in the share of the urban population worsened national income inequality in 
three countries, with the exception being China (the contribution of urbanisation to income inequality 
                                                            
4 NIRA (2012) summarises the both opinions.  The former opinion is represented by Yasuyuki Todo, who also worries that 
too many factors are brought into a discussion of a middle-income trap, whereas the only factor determining long-term 
growth is productivity growth.  The latter opinion is stated by Junhua Wu, pointing out that possible paths to the trap 
include not only a social unrest but also insufficient education in rural areas becoming a fetter against economic growth. 6 
 
is negligibly negative in China). 
 
Figure 1: Urbanisation and Gini coefficient (annual movement, from 2000 to 2010) 
 
Source: World Bank Data and Euromonitor (2012) 
 
Of course, the other argument is that worsening of income inequality would be a cause of the 
middle-income trap. To conform if income inequality has any relationship with the middle-income trap, 
the following two propositions should be satisfied: first, to confirm that income inequality is a problem 
that should be dealt with when a country reaches MIC level; second, to analyse how income inequality 
would hamper economic growth in the medium or long term. The Kuznets hypothesis could contribute 
to the former, and the basic-needs approach may explain the latter. 
 
(1)  Kuznets hypothesis: income inequality and the level of economic development 
According to the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis, income distribution worsens in the early stage of 
development and then improves in the course of development. In the early stage of economic 
development, a country has to concentrate limited domestic resources on prioritised sectors in order to 
accelerate economic development. In the course of development, the country begins to consider an 
equitable distribution of the benefits of growth among the population, and policy measures result in an 
improvement in income distribution. If this hypothesis is applied to the real world, the relationship 
between the income levels of countries and their degree of income inequality displays an inverted U-
shape (frequently termed the Kuznets curve).   
In fact, the applicability of the hypothesis always faces criticism in terms of both methodology 
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and implication
5. I estimated (Egawa, 2012a) the Kuznets curve with per-capita GDP on the horizontal 
axis and the average S5/S1 ratio
6  on the vertical axis. Even though the R-squared is very small 
(0.0712), an inverse-U Kuznets curve can be drawn with the income level which gives the peak of the 
curve at $3,836 in purchasing power parity (PPP), which is considered to be at lower-middle-income 
countries level. With these observations, it is worth considering that income inequality is related to the 
middle-income trap because (i) it becomes a problem when a country exits least-developed level, and 
(ii) MICs with higher s5/s1 ratio than the asymptotic line would have a problem for economic growth.   
 
(2)  Human development and economic growth potential 
The basic-needs approach emerged in the 1970s, and UNDP (2011) follows this approach.  They 
point out that income inequality is related to the limits of “human development”. As low-income 
households can less afford education and healthcare, they are less likely to engage in productivity-
driven industries. Abundance of educated and healthy workers is key for the development of a high-
value added and knowledge-based economy. Moreover, low-income households tend to pay little 
attention to eco-friendliness and environmental protection, which would harm the sustainability of 
economic development.  Birdsall et al (1995) argue with an empirical analysis that greater equality in 
income distribution would raise average nutrition standards and entail more widespread education.  
Based on these thoughts, UNDP (2011) calculated Inequality-adjusted Human Development Indicators 
(IHDI). I attempted to calculate future rankings of IHDI for the Asian countries in 2020 with and without 
improvement in income distribution (Egawa, 2012; Table 2). The results show that, for China, the IHDI 
rank would increase but would decline somewhat if income distribution is not improved. For Thailand, 
the IHDI rank in 2020 would increase if there is improvement in income distribution, but would even 
drop from 2011 if there is not.   
 
  
                                                            
5 Anand and Kanbur (1993) argue that the result of a data analysis is strongly dependent on the method of calculating 
income disparity and the choice of the base year; showing those differences can produce a U relationship, an inverse-U 
relationship, or no relationship at all.  Bigsten (1987: 146-9) points out the political changes in Taiwan and South Korea 
just after the second world war realised relatively equal distribution of wealth and their development happened alongside 
an increase in the incomes of the poor.  
6 The S5/S1 ratio is the ratio of the average income of the highest-earning 20 percent (S5) against the average income of the 
lowest-earning 20 percent (S1). The IMF Database offers S5 and S1 data for every year from 2000 to 2010 for a few 
countries. Here, the average of the available data for 2000-10 is employed. This means that if data is only available for 
one year, the data is adopted as is, without averaging. 8 
 
Table 2: Change in the ranking where there is no improvement of income distribution until 2020 
 
China India Indonesia 
2011 2020 2011 2020 2011 2020
Position on HDI  101 134 124   
Position on IHDI (improvement of income 
distribution) 
102 
91 
(+11) 
133 
130 
(+3) 
116 
109 
(+7) 
Position on IHDI (no change in income inequality) 92 130-131   111
 
Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
2011 2020 2011 2020 2011 2020
Position on HDI  112 103 128   
Position on IHDI (improvement of income 
distribution) 
108 111  (-3) 101 
100 
(+1) 
114 
107 
(+7) 
Position on IHDI (no change in income inequality) 113 101-102   107
Source and note: Figures for 2011 are taken from UNDP (2011).  However, the UNDP (2011) does not show relative 
positioning for the IHDI in 2011, but only the degree of change from the HDI.  Egawa (2012) calculated relative positioning 
on the IHDI based on this data.  Figures for 2020 are from Egawa (2012).  UNDP (2011) does not provide data of IHDI for 
Malaysia. 
 
On the other hand, if the need to deal with income inequality is recognised by the government, 
measures to tackle it would limit the amount of the budget that can be used for economic development. 
The measures for income inequality include direct income redistribution measures such as negative 
income taxes, social security measures such as unemployment pay or pensions, redemption of VAT for 
necessary goods and so on. These measures require huge amounts of budget, especially at the initial 
stage of their operation, and reduce the amount of budget available for economic development. 
Besides, government revenues in Asian UMICs are relatively small (the revenue/GDP ratio is lower than 
25 percent in the UMICs in Asia, compared to more than 30 percent in Japan for example) and are not 
expected to increase in the near future (Figure 2). Another option would be to introduce each scheme 
one by one. The success of introducing the schemes one by one would depend on whether the 
government can order its priorities in a democratic way. Otherwise, social satisfaction with the 
government’s policies might be undermined because the benefits that the public need most may come 
later. In addition, business sectors’ needs may not be met if government decides the order. For Asian 
UMICs, the period of government-led development has already passed and they are now at the stage at 
which more democratic decision-making is expected. However, democratic decision-making in China, 
Malaysia and Thailand is still weak (Figure 3).   
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Figure 2: Measures cannot be introduced simultaneously (smaller budget size) 
 
 
Figure 3: Democratic decision-making is not very likely in Asian UMICs (Freedom House Index) 
 
Source and note for Figures 2 and 3: IMF “World Economic Outlook Database” and Freedom House International. Budget size 
is total general government revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
If the relationship between the degree of income inequality and economic growth rates can be 
identified, we can have an idea of the likelihood of each Asian MIC falling into the trap. Therefore, a 
cross-economy regression should be attempted, with growth rate as the regressant. In fact, there have 
been lots of quantitative studies on the relationship between income inequality and growth rate. Here, 
what should be identified are (1) income inequality is a problem for MICs in terms of economic growth, 
not for low-income countries, and (2) insufficient access to education and healthcare would reduce the 
growth rate. The former is related to the Kuznets hypothesis, ie worsening income distribution would 
raise the economic growth rate at the early stage of economic development, but reduce it afterwards. 
Therefore, the coefficients for the variable measuring income inequality    can be formed as   =
  (   	   	      ) ⁄ − β		(α >   > 0). As the per-capita GDP increases,   becomes lower, and 
zero when per-capita GDP equals α  ⁄ , and then becomes negative if the per-capita GDP becomes 
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greater. It is necessary to examine whether these coefficients have correct signs with statistical 
significance, and at what level of per-capita GDP the sign of   would change. A few more factors linked 
with the observations above (interpreting factors in the left-hand column of Table 1), such as 
urbanisation, working-age population, R&D and the transparency of political decision-making, are also 
included. The details of each variable are shown in Annex Table 2.   
Table 3 shows the result. In all cases, urbanisation is not statistically significant, maybe because it 
occurs with economic growth but is correlated with income inequality. The transparency of political 
decision-making (Freedom House Index) would positively affect economic growth with statistical 
significance when the Gini coefficient is employed alongside it, although the coefficient for the Index is 
expected to be negative.  
Looking at the measurement of income inequality, s5/s1 ratio measures the income “gap” 
between the top and bottom income groups. The result (2) indicates that the Kuznets hypothesis is 
applied with statistical significance, and an increase in the Gini coefficient would reduce the growth 
rate when the country’s income level is above $5650 in PPP (=exp(4.4856/0.5192)).  Malaysia, 
Thailand and China exceeded this level in 1992, 2003 and 2007, respectively. Indonesia is 
approaching this level ($4358 in PPP in 2010). In fact, these countries’ s5/s1 ratio is below the 
average, but their s5/s1 level could turn negative if they leave it untreated. The same analysis can be 
applied to the results with the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient measures the nationwide inequality 
of income distribution, including the individuals in the middle income strata. From the result (4), it can 
be calculated that the increase in Gini has a negative effect on the growth rate when the per-capita GDP 
exceeds $13073 in PPP. Malaysia exceeded this level in 2007 and, according to the IMF’s April 2013 
Outlook, China and Thailand will exceed this level in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Therefore, it can be 
said that income inequality will become a problem for (upper) MICs and will reduce the growth rate if 
left untreated. 
In terms of human development aspects, for education, the results of the regression with s5/s1 
ratio have positive coefficients but none are statistically significant. For the Gini coefficient, the 
coefficients for primary education enrolment rate are negative, although they are not statistically 
significant. The coefficients for the secondary education enrolment rate are positive and statistically 
significant. Moreover, the coefficients for secondary education are greatest when only the data for the 
countries whose per-capita GDP is above $5000 is used. Currently, the secondary education enrolment 
rate for Asian MICs is about 70 percent. The result shows that a 1 percentage-point increase in the rate 
would raise the per-capita economic growth rate by 0.0823 percentage points. If the countries realise 
full secondary education enrolment in the near future, the growth rate would increase by more than 2 
percentage points. Policies for raising enrolment rates for secondary education would work well as 11 
 
inequality-alleviating measures and would reduce the risk of falling into the middle-income trap. Life 
expectancy would affect the growth rate. The estimates tell us that the increase in the life expectancy 
would increase the growth rate until life expectancy reaches 61.2 years (with s5/s1) and 67.4 years 
old (with Gini coefficient); thereafter the growth rate decreases as life expectancy continues to rise. 
These results support the assertion that income inequality would also affect the growth rate if 
assessed according to the basic-needs approach. All three Asian UMICs reached this level in the early 
1980s, so the period when the basic-needs approach was applied was already over in terms of 
healthcare. 
The ratio of working age population positively affects the economic growth rate. Although it is 
arguable that this factor is related to the middle-income trap, the end of the demographic dividend, 
which is expected to happen in the near future in Asian UMICs, would at least reduce the economic 
growth rate of these countries. The high-tech export share is statistically insignificant. However, using 
data only for countries with an income level above $5000, the coefficient for high-tech export shares is 
positive with statistical significance. Therefore, upgrading the economic structure would also increase 
the economic growth rate for MICs. 
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Table 3: Determinants of GDP growth rates (results) 
 
 
 
  
Intercept -37.4397 *** -37.5926 *** -60.4487 ** -56.7180 *** -53.4537 ** -49.8024 ** -54.2172 * -91.9230 -202.1921 ** -99.9106 -24.4809 -489.9076 ** -45.1262
   [t-value]
s5s1 -0.5041 ** -0.5192 *** -2.2497 *** -2.8655 *** -2.4552 ** -2.6370 *
   [t-value]
s5s1/GDP 4.3652 *** 4.4856 *** 20.1967 *** 27.0522 *** 23.3633 ** 24.8213 *
   [t-value]
Gini -36.8828 *** -38.8260 *** -41.1695 *** -48.0196 *** -57.9962 *** -61.9723 *** -67.0080 ***
   [t-value]
Gini/GDP 352.2623 *** 368.0084 *** 399.4846 *** 478.8136 *** 574.8416 *** 603.4946 *** 656.8894 ***
   [t-value]
Primary education 0.0267 0.0270 -0.0301 -0.0267 -0.0369 0.0977 -0.0292 0.0372 -0.0487 -0.0803 -0.0718 -0.2316 ** -0.0778
   [t-value]
Secondary education 0.0035 0.0033 0.0837 *** 0.0823 *** 0.0871 *** 0.0242 0.1009 *** 0.0501 ** 0.0986 *** 0.0540 0.0682 ** 0.0226 0.0202
   [t-value]
Life expectancy 0.8412 *** 0.8450 *** 1.4832 ** 1.3350 ** 1.1807 * 1.0055 1.3151 ** 2.0466 5.2592 ** 2.5120 0.8328 12.8844 ** 1.5384
   [t-value]
Square of Life expectancy -0.0068 *** -0.0069 *** -0.0110 ** -0.0099 ** -0.0086 * -0.0081 -0.0095 ** -0.0141 -0.0351 ** -0.0167 -0.0063 -0.0821 ** -0.0106
   [t-value]
Working age population 0.1735 *** 0.1723 *** 0.1344 * 0.1411 ** 0.1693 ** 0.1477 0.0656 0.1800 ** 0.0426 0.1656 * 0.0037 0.0827 -0.0541
   [t-value]
high-tech export -0.0080 -0.0081 0.0080 0.0104 0.0095 0.0262 0.0368 ** 0.0070 0.0261 ** -0.0059 0.0360 ** 0.0109 0.0453 ***
   [t-value]
freedomhouse index 0.1874 0.1925 -0.0651 -0.1025 -0.2652 -0.3712 0.8984
   [t-value]
Urban population -0.0030 -0.0054
   [t-value]
dummy (2000s) 1.4066 *** 1.4153 *** 0.6496 0.6358 1.6428 *** 0.7146 0.1266 0.1387
   [t-value]
Adjusted R Square
Observations
[A] Regressant: Per-capita GDP growth rate
[-4.9159] [-4.9703] [-2.1739] [-0.8006] [-0.6021] [-2.4907]
138
0.3035 0.3087
[-2.4984] [-2.7064]
[1.5086] [1.5402]
[-1.9639]
[2.6206] [2.8235]
0.3484 0.5019 0.4386 0.3248
[-1.5406] [-2.2213]
[-0.2499]
[3.6850] [3.7369]
[2.7902]
[1.5397]
[0.8929]
[1.5445]
[-1.6402]
[1.6207] [2.9328] [2.9330]
[-0.5101] [-0.5183]
[1.3761] [1.4346]
[0.2178] [0.2083]
[3.4456] [3.4807]
[-3.5745] [-3.6338]
[-1.0959]
[1.5624]
[2.7052]
[-1.0982]
[1.6902]
[0.5790]
[-0.5927]
[1.7946]
[-0.2913]
[-1.0015]
[3.5588]
[0.6196]
[2.0909]
[0.6662]
[-0.7038]
[2.0913]
[0.4489]
[-2.6189] [-2.6568] [-2.4918]
65 39 30
[0.2277]
[1.3556]
[-0.5017]
[2.8611]
[-2.7091] [-3.4425] [-2.6121]
[3.0551] [3.4997] [3.8305]
[-2.1328] [-2.1825] [-1.9178]
[-2.8863] [-3.4317] [-3.6351]
[2.1243] [2.1581] [1.9141]
[-0.6741] [-0.6132] [-0.8512]
[3.5883] [3.7786] [3.9949]
[-0.1950] [-0.3464]
0.3106 0.3251 0.3124
[-2.5604] [-2.2813]
[-0.4862] [-1.0716]
[1.6028] [1.6087]
[2.2389] [0.2534] [0.4502]
[0.8879]
[-3.5446] [-4.9459] [-5.0550] [-4.6224]
[3.9071] [5.1567] [5.1458] [4.5756]
[1.8692]
[0.5509]
[2.4743]
[-2.4582]
[0.9372] [0.8326] [0.0671]
0.3670 0.5234 0.4960 0.5252
93 25 77 60 52 46
Over 12500
[2.3000] [2.1091] [2.4203] [3.1607]
[-2.2765] [-2.2936] [-0.2973] [-0.4795]
[-0.9772]
[-1.5196]
[3.7421] [4.4594] [2.5847] [0.6436]
(5) (2) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Over 5000 Over 7500 Over 10000
(2) (5) (2)
[2.3071]
[-0.3679]
[-0.2861]
[1.8341] [2.0685] [2.5446]
[0.5086] [0.6999] [0.6320]
(2) (5)
[0.5139]
[1.6443]
[0.2856]13 
 
Table 3: Determinants of GDP growth rates (results) (continued) 
 
 
 
[B] Regressant: GDP growth rate
Intercept -30.2423 *** -30.1060 *** -42.3029 * -43.3393 * -39.7158 -18.6866 -55.3786 ** -82.8832 -328.2455 *** -54.4024 -205.1511 -534.8099 ** -373.5809 *
   [t-value]
s5s1 -0.4002 * -0.3867 * -1.9082 ** -1.8369 * -1.2822 -1.2908
   [t-value]
s5s1/GDP 3.5385 * 3.4312 ** 17.5696 ** 18.3211 ** 13.3895 13.1484
   [t-value]
Gini -25.3317 * -21.4794 * -23.2588 * -8.4810 -29.5766 ** -26.8109 -42.3933 **
   [t-value]
Gini/GDP 280.9762 ** 250.9328 ** 274.3291 ** 155.0442 333.1670 ** 304.0759 * 449.3228 **
   [t-value]
Primary education 0.0213 0.0210 -0.0500 -0.0509 -0.0569 0.0783 -0.0086 0.0034 -0.0456 -0.1047 -0.0623 -0.3581 ** -0.0790
   [t-value]
Secondary education -0.0072 -0.0071 0.0642 ** 0.0692 *** 0.0729 *** 0.0050 0.0636 ** 0.0311 0.0730 *** 0.0546 0.0656 * 0.0621 0.0229
   [t-value]
Life expectancy 0.9164 *** 0.9130 *** 0.9786 1.0432 0.8859 0.3743 1.3372 * 1.8639 8.5006 *** 1.3170 5.4062 14.0926 * 9.8744 *
   [t-value]
Square of Life expectancy -0.0072 *** -0.0071 *** -0.0069 -0.0074 -0.0061 -0.0031 -0.0098 * -0.0120 -0.0559 *** -0.0083 -0.0358 -0.0890 * -0.0638 *
   [t-value]
Working age population 0.0223 0.0234 0.0978 0.0808 0.1005 0.0166 0.0695 0.1326 0.0464 0.1439 0.0275 0.0996 -0.0445
   [t-value]
high-tech export 0.0053 0.0054 0.0213 0.0189 0.0188 0.0429 ** 0.0379 ** 0.0115 0.0210 -0.0051 0.0263 -0.0047 0.0466 **
   [t-value]
freedomhouse index 0.3096 ** 0.3051 ** 0.4090 ** 0.4249 ** 0.4539 ** 0.1060 0.2999 0.1563 0.5640 *** -0.1368 0.5418 *** 1.1572 0.8329 ***
   [t-value]
Urban population 0.0027 0.0128
   [t-value]
dummy (2000s) 1.5939 *** 1.5862 *** 0.4810 0.4567 1.6569 ** 0.4977 -0.0104 -0.0318
   [t-value]
Adjusted R Square
Observations
[-1.8423] [-1.8728] [-2.0772] [-2.0242] [-1.1873] [-0.7584]
[-3.6887] [-3.6980] [-0.7373] [-0.6621] [-0.2853] [-2.1451] [-1.2299]
[1.1224] [1.1133] [1.1144] [0.0517] [-1.2454] [-2.7095]
[1.9734] [2.0065] [2.1941] [2.2108] [1.3494] [0.7812]
[-1.6303]
[2.2731] [2.2046] [2.4551]
[3.4869] [3.4940] [0.5197] [0.5565] [0.2642] [2.1352]
[-0.4236] [-0.4168] [0.1655] [1.1901] [1.4878] [1.1971] [2.5659] [2.9317] [3.1167] [2.0187] [2.8336] [2.0014]
[0.3503] [0.3699] [0.1651] [1.4135] [1.3570] [0.8437]
[-3.4751] [-3.4857] [-0.5746] [-0.5503] [-0.2577] [-2.1027] [-1.2602] [-1.3485] [-1.1454] [-1.7744]
[1.2449] [1.0978] [1.4089] [0.8468] [0.7766] [0.3972]
[2.1117] [2.1123] [0.4688] [0.5925] [-0.3213] [1.6709]
[0.3153] [0.3218] [2.0103] [0.6720] [-0.2207] [-0.1727] [1.2552] [1.1462] [1.1392] [2.0107]
138 65 39 30 25
[-3.1244]
0.2247 0.2305 0.2920 0.3039 0.1090 0.0920 0.2598 0.2651 0.2640 0.2028
[3.8790] [3.8909] [2.6084] [0.9980] [-0.0162] [-0.0517]
[0.2069]
93
[-1.7096] [-1.7617] [-1.6291] [-2.0963]
[0.6363]
(5) (2) (5) (2) (5)
[-1.8491] [-1.7542] [-1.9163] [-0.5300] [-2.0455]
[-1.0471] [-1.0688] [-1.2027] [-0.1215] [-0.8670] [-1.0560] [-1.2036]
[1.0742] [2.4529] [1.9459]
[1.3074] [1.4118] [1.2231] [1.8043] [3.0652] [1.2497] [1.9047]
[-3.0995] [-1.2848] [-1.9218]
[1.1070] [1.0589]
[1.4430] [1.2876] [2.1884]
[2.1563] [2.2682] [2.4470] [1.6011] [3.6588] [2.7281] [3.6310]
0.4216 0.3503 0.4512
77 60 52 46
All Over 5000 Over 7500 Over 10000 Over 12500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) (5) (2)
[-0.6174]
[0.5671]
[2.3825]
[-2.2071]
[-1.8694]14 
 
 
 
Using results (2) and (4) in Table 3, the average growth rates are employed here (Table 4, their 
values are in the cells named as “Critical”). If the estimated growth rate falls below the average growth 
rate, there is room to suspect that the country might fall into the middle-income trap. So we conduct a 
sensitivity analysis; Table 4 gives the critical value of each variable at which the estimated growth rate 
falls below the average growth rate (the value in the cells named “Critical” in Table 4). The following 
finding can be identified. First, the estimated growth rates of the three Asian UMICs are by far lower than 
their actual growth rates, but above the average growth rate when the s5/s1 ratio is used. However, the 
difference between estimated and critical growth rate is not large for Malaysia and Thailand (the 
difference between them is 1.2 percentage points for Malaysia and 1.8 for Thailand, whereas it is 2.9 for 
China). Second, the three countries need to narrow the income gap between the top and bottom income 
groups taking into account their per-capita GDP levels, but the s5/s1 value is still lower than the critical 
value and other variables have not reached the critical values even in the recent years. This means that 
the countries take steps to narrow the income gap without worrying about other income-inequality 
related problems.   
Third, the estimate using the Gini coefficient shows that the estimated growth rates for China and 
Malaysia are lower than their average growth rates, although the difference is very small. The result of 
the sensitivity analysis using the Gini coefficient tells us that China and Malaysia should upgrade their 
economies, and Malaysia should improve its secondary education enrolment rate, and should directly 
improve income distribution. 
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis (results) 
 
Notes:  1. The estimated and critical growth rates are calculated with the countries’ per-capita GDP in 2012. 2. The result 
should be interpreted as follows; (1) for the results with s5/s1 and for the result for Thailand with Gini coefficient, the actual 
values should not reach the critical levels.  (2) For the results for China and Malaysia with Gini coefficient, the actual values 
should achieve the critical levels in order to realise the estimated growth rate above average. 3. The bold italic figures 
indicate that they do not meet critical levels. 
 
4.  Discussion: can the middle-income trap be avoided through income redistribution? 
 
Our analysis has shown that, as the Kuznets hypothesis indicates, income inequality is a problem 
for MICs in terms of the relationship with economic growth, and that the basic-needs approach, 
especially access to secondary education, explains the growth rate. As the demographic dividend will 
soon dry up, all Asian UMICs are trying to upgrade their economic structures (see Appendix 1). On the 
other hand, measures for alleviating income inequality and improving school enrolment have seen 
little progress. The question now is what can be done to prevent the middle-income trap through the 
alleviation of income inequality? 
 
(1)  Narrowing rural-urban income disparities 
Since income inequality is considered to be caused in part by rural-urban income disparities, 
policy measures targeting rural development may work. Developing economic infrastructure in cities 
(eg roads to connect them with megacities, well-developed industrial estates) are typical policy 
measures and would incentivise entrepreneurs in the megacities to shift their labour-intensive, low 
value-added production processes or industries to the rural cities. This shift could also be accelerated 
by investment promotion by the government, such as corporate tax reductions for new investment in 
rural areas. In fact, China has concentrated public investment into local infrastructure development 
since the global financial crisis, and Thailand has given greater tax privileges to foreign investors with 
the aim of establishing firms in areas remote from Bangkok and its vicinities. However, this may only 
Estimate Critical Recent Estimate Critical Recent Estimate Critical Recent
GDPpc growth 4.693 1.768 7.800 (2012) 2.695 1.429 5.613 (2012) 3.559 1.710 6.435 (2012)
s5/s1 7.363 113.631 9.605 (2005) 10.451 32.086 11.333 (2009) 7.937 64.210 7.078 (2009)
Primary education (90.872) (below 0) (no data) 95.851 49.002 95.891 (2005) 91.543 23.117 89.680 (2009)
Secondary education (59.134) (below 0) (no data) 69.201 (below 0) 68.610 (2010) 70.520 (below 0) 71.470 (2012)
Life expectancy 72.305 84.622 73.486 (2011) 73.119 79.260 74.261 (2011) 73.268 81.559 74.091 (2011)
Working age population 71.612 54.636 73.336 (2012) 65.531 58.184 68.185 (2012) 70.364 59.633 72.118 (2012)
high-tech export 27.070 ------- 25.808 (2011) 52.271 ------- 43.390 (2011) 27.466 ------- 20.472 (2011)
freedomhouse index 6.600 ------- 6.500 (2011) 4.650 ------- 4.000 (2011) 2.650 ------- 4.000 (2011)
Estimate Critical Recent Estimate Critical Recent Estimate Critical Recent
GDPpc growth 2.366 2.418 7.800 (2012) 1.324 1.450 5.613 (2012) 2.926 2.252 6.435 (2012)
Gini 0.402 0.437 0.513 (2010) 0.442 0.319 0.503 (2010) 0.480 (below 0) 0.455 (2010)
Primary education 90.872 ------- (no data) 95.851 ------- 95.891 (2005) 91.543 ------- 89.680 (2009)
Secondary education 59.134 59.772 (no data) 69.201 70.733 68.610 (2010) 70.520 62.332 71.470 (2012)
Life expectancy 72.305 71.679 73.486 (2011) 73.119 71.757 74.261 (2011) 73.268 77.689 74.091 (2011)
Working age population 71.612 71.985 73.336 (2012) 65.531 66.425 68.185 (2012) 70.364 65.585 72.118 (2012)
high-tech export 27.070 32.113 25.808 (2011) 52.271 64.390 43.390 (2011) 27.466 (below 0) 20.472 (2011)
s5/s1
China Malaysia Thailand
Gini16 
 
postpone the middle-income trap because such measures do not upgrade the economic structure of 
the country or increase the productivity of labour. 
 
(2)  Benefits for low-income individuals 
Other options would be in-cash and in-kind benefits to low-income individuals and a minimum 
wage hike. All Asian UMICs have raised their minimum wages sharply in recent years. However, some of 
these policies are not linked to the effort to raise labour productivity, or will have a counter effect on 
economic growth and structural change. For example, Thailand changed its minimum wage scheme to a 
uniform minimum wage nationwide in early 2012, resulting in a huge hike of the minimum wage in 
peripheral areas (up to 90 percent in two years). This may widen (not narrow) rural-urban income 
disparities by preventing factories from operating in rural areas where the wage level was formerly well 
below that in the megacities. There are similar concerns about Malaysia’s “bumiputera policy”, an 
affirmative action favouring indigenous Malays, who are considered to be poorer and have fewer 
opportunities than those of other ethnic groups. With this policy, Malays have been offered greater 
opportunities in education and work for example, and the policy has succeeded in producing an urban 
Malay middle class. Now, however, companies in Malaysia have lost opportunities to increase their 
productivity by hiring talented people more from other ethnic groups. Moreover, for the country itself, 
the policy deprives a large portion of people of opportunities to improve their educational 
achievements and contribute to the economy, which results in a reducing of the country’s labour 
productivity. The policy has also contributed to a brain drain from the country. 
 
(3)  A rich-to-poor transfer 
A simple rich-to-poor transfer would be the most efficient way of income redistribution, as we 
know from microeconomics textbooks. Measures could include a mixture of progressive income 
taxation, wealth taxation and taxation of real estate transactions, insurance schemes for (or free 
provision of) public health and education, and so on. The countries that we consider have already 
established progressive income tax programmes, but their governments cannot always identify the 
correct taxation levels because it has not established the system enough to capture individual income 
levels (especially in the border areas of Thailand and China, or in informal sectors).  Because of this, 
only the workers in larger firms and the public sector are subject to the income tax programme, and the 
tax programme does not work as a rich-to-poor income redistribution mechanism nationwide. 
 
(4)  Primary and secondary education 
If income inequality is left untreated, human development would be delayed, and negatively 17 
 
affect economic growth because of lower productivity. In turn, slower economic growth delays human 
development, which may lead to rigidity of social class in the country and produce a vicious circle, 
increasing the risk of social unrest and the risk of falling into a middle-income trap. Therefore, tackling 
this problem is a further urgent political issue for the countries concerned. For education, necessary 
policies include direct in-kind provision (free compulsory education) and measures for ensuring the 
schooling of children from poor households. In fact, the primary education enrolment rates in Asian 
UMICs are high, but full enrolment has not been achieved yet, even though free compulsory education 
schemes have been implemented. For secondary education, the enrolment rate is 72.2 percent in 
Malaysia and 68.6 percent in Thailand (no data for China).   
All Asian UMICs are now implementing educational reforms focusing mainly on the quality aspects 
of compulsory education. These include provision of quality education to rural areas, improving 
teachers’ abilities, revising curricula in response to economic and social changes and needs (to 
develop ICT skills for example), and so on. However, to promote human development, these countries 
need to tackle the obstacles preventing children from poor households from being schooled, and to 
raise the enrolment rate at the same time (secondary school enrolment in particular). Possible 
measures include vouchers for education, prohibition of children labour and the reduction of schooling 
costs. These efforts would enable escape from the vicious circle connecting income inequality (rigidity 
of social class) and insufficient human development at the bottom of the pyramid. 
 
(5)  Vocational training 
Increasing the number of skilled workers is an urgent priority for MICs, because it will take time 
until a majority of the working-age population has a good education and can start working as an 
educated worker, though rapid structural change is required in the face of international competition. 
Asian UMICs have expanded the capacity of universities and polytechnics and try to provide more 
talented workers to the labour market, from their higher education systems.  
A current problem is that supply of and demand for university graduates are not balanced in the 
labour markets. In China, since there is an oversupply of educated labour, the acceleration of economic 
structural change causes few problems in terms of labour demand and supply in the high-value-added 
industries. However, in Malaysia and Thailand, a short supply of educated labour is a problem even 
currently. In Thailand, there are too few natural science graduates entering the labour market, whereas 
there are too many arts and social science graduates. Malaysia has a brain drain problem, as we have 
noted.  The problem for vocational training would be how to deliver the training to low-skilled workers 
living in rural areas, slum areas or in mountain areas. Most of these inhabitants work and maintain 
themselves at subsistence level. If there is only small demand for talented labour in the workplace and 18 
 
if an increase in demand is unlikely to occur in the near future, they would be unwilling to start 
vocational training. Nevertheless, income inequality would be widened unless these workers have 
some kind of skills that can be used in a productivity-driven economy. On the other hand, even if all 
citizens are willing to participate in vocational training, the government might not be able to afford to 
deliver it in a short period of time, because the population of the current Asian UMICs is large. 
 
(6)  Fiscal burden for alleviating income inequality 
Asian UMICs are learning, or trying to learn, from advance countries’ experiences of introducing 
various social safety net programmes (public health insurance, pensions, etc.). Some programmes 
have already been implemented in Asian UMICs. However, every possible measure (described above 
and others, such as developing a social safety net or social security schemes) requires a huge amount 
of budget, especially at the initial stage of implementation. This means that it is very difficult for Asian 
UMICs to introduce all the schemes at one time. Although they can introduce each scheme one by one, 
the government has to order the priorities in a democratic way but, as seen in Figure 3, three Asian 
UMICs have shortcomings when it comes to democratic decision-making. Moreover, Asian countries 
sometimes insist that, unlike western countries, they need strong government initiatives in order to 
realise fast economic development. This means that it may not be expected for Asian countries to 
change their political standpoints. In this sense, fiscal reforms (especially tax reform) would be a short-
cut for implementing more measures to improve income distribution.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Asia’s growth is promising, but there exist risk factors that put Asian countries at risk of falling into 
a middle-income trap. In order to avoid this, improving income distribution is a good option and is 
socially desirable in Asian UMICs. As income inequality, insufficient provision of education to the 
bottom of the pyramid and economic growth might lead to the development of a vicious circle, a 
measure to prevent the circle is inevitable, which can be done by free provision of education as an in-
kind benefit, for example, or direct income redistributive programmes. For the Asian UMICs, the effort to 
improve income distribution and secondary education enrolment would be good for the economy, and 
would lead to the economic growth rate picking up. 
Effort must be made to avoid the trap or to tackle these limitations, but as we have discussed, it 
will not be easy. Therefore, the Asian UMICs are struggling and there is sometimes scepticism about 
their further economic advancement. Advanced countries (those that have successfully avoided or 
escaped the trap already) can assist Asian UMICs through an exchange of experience.     19 
 
Appendix: Failure to accomplish a timely shift of the economic structure 
 
South-east Asian countries accelerated their economic growth by becoming places of strategic 
importance for manufacturing supply chains set up mainly by Japanese manufacturers. Japanese 
companies sought countries that offered cheap labour and good investment opportunities, and in turn, 
some south-east Asian countries such as Malaysia and Thailand advanced their strategies to attract 
foreign inward investment
7. In the same way, China has offered an opportunity of cost reduction for 
manufacturing and has grown faster since the early 1990s. These three countries have now become 
UMICs. 
However, if these countries stay as low-cost assembly bases with little improvement in their own 
innovation, they will lose out in terms of costs to new-frontier countries such as India, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar. Krugman (1994) argued that input-driven economic growth would 
face diminishing returns, taking Asian New Industrialised Economies (NIEs) as an example. Now, Asian 
UMICs seem to face the same situation. The problems for Asian UMICs in this context are that wage 
increases without high productivity growth would give investors an incentive to exclude the countries 
concerned from the supply chain, and that they still face obstacles to realising productivity-driven 
growth. 
 
An opportunity for structural change 
As Table 1 shows, an increase in the wage of unskilled workers triggers the risk that a country will 
fall into a middle-income trap. On the other hand, it is natural that wages increase as a nation’s per-
capita income increases. Moreover, those countries have raised their minimum wage sharply (Figure 
A1). Although minimum wages have been raised in lower-middle-income countries, the difference in 
minimum wage levels is unlikely to narrow so rapidly. 
 
  
                                                            
7In addition, Kimura and Todo (2007) find that Japanese ODA had a side-effect of giving information on business 
circumstances to Japanese companies, which they call a vanguard effect, and this effect was unique to Japan’s ODA.   20 
 
Figure A1: Minimum wage levels and rates of increase 
  
       Source: Egawa (2013). 
 
However, stopping the increase in the (minimum) wage level is not a policy option for avoiding a 
middle-income trap, because it would tautologically hamper the increase in national income level. 
Instead, it is inevitable that UMICs will establish an economic structure within which economic growth 
and high wages are compatible. UMICs will no longer be selected as the place of labour-intensive 
production processes by both foreign and domestic business. For domestic factories in UMICs, it would 
also be better to establish their own production networks (supply chains) with neighbouring countries, 
outsourcing input-intensive production processes to the countries offering lower labour costs. In order 
to facilitate this, UMICs can sharp increase minimum wages. 
 
Has productivity growth in Asian UMICs stopped, or are governments trying to boost it? 
If we only look at wage levels, the risk of a middle-income trap seems to have been triggered. 
However, whether China, Malaysia or Thailand fall into a trap or not depends on their efforts to improve 
productivity growth. Therefore, it must be checked if productivity growth in UMICs has stopped, and if 
they are trying to improve their productivity growth. The total factor productivity (TFP) of Asian 
countries is shown in Figure A2 (1995=100). China’s TFP has grown most rapidly. However, Malaysia 
has not regained the productivity level it had in 1995, and productivity is almost at the same level as in 
the early 1980s. Thailand’s TFP is slightly above its 1995 level, but has not been improved since the 
latter half of the first decade of the 2000s. The efficiency of investment with incremental capital-output 
ratio (ICOR, Figure A3), however, has not deteriorated very much in the three UMICs, except during the 
period of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. Malaysia’s ICOR stands even lower than in 1990 (showing 
that Malaysia has a greater investment efficiency than in 1990). 
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Figure A2: Total factor productivity growth in Asia 
 
Source: Asian Productivity Organization (2012). 
 
Figure A3: ICOR 
 
Source: World Bank. Note: 7-year moving average backward. 
 
Together with Figure A4, these observations show that China has showed good productivity 
growth, but has a problem with inefficiency of investment, resulting from overinvestment (see 
Eichengreen  et al, 2011, who estimate that the risk of significant economic slowdown would be 
minimised when the investment share to GDP reaches 29 percent). Malaysia’s problem is low 
productivity growth, but it has maintained the efficiency of investment. For Thailand, inefficiency of 
investment is a problem but overinvestment has not been seen. Thailand's productivity growth has not 
been high since the Asian crisis, but has developed in a similar way to Singapore and Hong Kong.   
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Figure A4: GDP growth rate and investment share to GDP 
 
Source: World Bank. 
 
Looking at governments’ efforts, all three UMICs have their own medium-term economic 
development plans aimed at improving economic efficiency and productivity. Policy measures include 
increasing the R&D budget, development of intellectual property rights protection laws, improvement 
of governance in the public sector and so on. According to World Bank Data, the share of expenditure on 
R&D to GDP in these countries is still far lower than in advanced countries (for example, 3.36 percent 
for Japan in 2009), China has increased it significantly from 0.57 percent in 1996 to 1.70 percent in 
2009. In Malaysia it grew from 0.22 percent in 1996 to 0.63 percent in 2006, and in Thailand from 0.12 
percent in 1996 to 0.21 percent in 2007. In addition, the government in every country encourages 
through privileges and incentives, including corporate tax reduction for a certain period, foreign direct 
investment in R&D-intensive and high-value-added industries. As long as their medium-term plans are 
implemented properly and on time, and structural changes are realised as planned, there should be 
little need to worry about these countries' future productivity growth. 
On the other hand, developing the skills of the labour force and increasing the size of the skilled 
labour force could be difficult. As it will take longer for these effects to become apparent, and all the 
UMICs (especially China) have large populations, policies for realising them should be implemented 
immediately. For vocational training, China has a concrete plan to speed up the establishment of 
vocational training schools in order to accept 5 million students by 2015. In Malaysia and Thailand, 
vocational training schemes have been implemented since the 1990s, but schools and universities 
(including polytechnics) are now considered to be the main organisations for producing skilled 
workers. 
 
How can UMICs advance their economies to high-income country level? 
In the early 1980s, Singapore and Taiwan succeeded in advancing their industrialisation through 
clear policies that took into account Japan’s experience of industrialisation. Korea, having in itself a 
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similar economic policy and structure to Japan including a convoy system
8, imported Japan’s 
experience of enabling high-tech industries and accelerated its economic growth while receiving a 
huge amount of investment from Japan. However, a convoy system contains protectionist policies and 
does not work well in an open economy. Japan was able to take this approach because the non-
openness of Japan’s market was not yet controversial in the 1960s. By contrast, the current Asian 
UMICs have realised their rapid economic development by opening their markets and linking closely 
with other economies with huge volumes of trade and inflows of FDI. Therefore, the UMICs cannot 
pursue protectionist policies but have to seek another path, compatible with a more open economy, to 
advance their economic structures. All three countries understand the necessity of this and each 
country aims its growth strategy at a high-value-added economy, as discussed before. However, 
implementation may be difficult politically, because sunset industries sometimes have lobbying 
powers, for example. Moreover, state-owned enterprises tend to be resistant to change. In any case, an 
effort to maintain these industries by providing subsidies will result in weaker economic growth and 
may lead countries to fall into the middle-income trap.  
                                                            
8A convoy system consists of protection of domestic basic industries from the pressure of entry of foreign companies and 
promotion of the industries with risk-taking and subsidies by the government, etc. in order to speed up their development 
to an advanced level. 24 
 
 
 
Annex Table 1: Asia’s rapid growth 
 
Source: World Bank “World Development Report”, “World Bank Data”. Note: “---“ = not available from the World Bank Data. 
 
Annex Table 2: Variables used for the regression 
Factor / Variable  definition Sign
Per-capita GDP growth rate 
(regressant) 
10-year average, 1991-2000 and 2001-2010, IMF-WEO Database. 
Income  level  Per-capita GDP in international dollar (PPP), 10-year average, 
1986-95 and 1996-2005, IMF-WEO Database. 
( -)
Inequality;   
   S5/S1 ratio, OR Gini coefficient 
S5/S1 ratio: 10-year average (available years only), 1986-1995 
and 1996-2005, IMF-WEO Database. 
Gini Coefficient: Data for 1990 and 2000, Euromonitor 
International “World Income Distribution Databook”. 
( -)
Urbanisation  Share of urban population.  10-year average, 1991-2000 and 
2001-2010, World Bank Database. 
?
Education 
    Primary education enrolment rate, 
AND 
  Secondary education enrolment rate 
10-year average, 1991-2000 and 2001-2010.  “Net” rates are 
used.   UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
( + )
Health Life  expectancy (age) at birth, 10-year average, 1991-2000 and 
2001-2010, World Bank Database.   
(+) (-)
Working-age population  Share of population of ages 15-64 to the total, 10-year average, 
1991-2000 and 2001-2010, World Bank Database. 
( + )
R&D; 
  Export share of high-tech 
manufacturing goods to total export 
(XH) 
10-year average, 1991-2000 and 2001-2010, United Nations 
Comtrade Database 
( + )
Political decision in line with 
development 
Freedom house index, 10-year average, 1986-1995 and 1996-
2005, Data from Freedomhouse International. 
( -)
 
 
 
27.580 Japan --- Taiwan 35.040 Japan 9.910 South Korea 44.900 Japan 20.870 South Korea
12.660 Hong Kong 26.930 Hong Kong --- Taiwan 42.930 Singapore --- Taiwan
11.450 Singapore 24.500 Singapore 36.010 Hong Kong
6.000 South Korea 3.420 Malaysia 8.770 Malaysia 4.940 China
4.440 Thailand
2.370 Malaysia 1.480 Thailand 1.930 Thailand 930 China 2.940 Indonesia 1.420 India
730 Philippines 1.050 Philippines 2.210 Philippines 1.270 Vietnam
1.130 Laos
600 Indonesia 200 Laos 560 Indonesia 290 Cambodia 820 Cambodia
390 India 130 Vietnam 450 India 280 Laos 780 Bangladesh
330 China --- Cambodia 390 Vietnam --- Myanmar --- Myanmar
290 Bangladesh --- Myanmar 380 Bangladesh
($2465) ($2995) ($4035)
Middle-income
Upper
($615) ($755) ($1025)
High-income
1990 (per-capita GNP) 2000 2011
Per-capita GNI
($7620) ($9265) ($12475)
Lower
Low-income25 
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